The NSDC smuggling list has emptied out: how Seyar Kurshutov and other figures avoided the extension of sanctions

15 жовтня 2024 р., 14:38

Микола Богданович   612   0  

The NSDC smuggling list has emptied out: how Seyar Kurshutov and other figures avoided the extension of sanctions

There are two pieces of news: the good news is that customs reform is not just about to start; it has been underway for a long time.

The bad news is that it is definitely not the reform you were thinking of. Through the efforts of the Bankova [Presidential Office], Ukraine has found itself held hostage by smugglers and is unlikely to escape anytime soon, even if we pass a hundred laws on raising salaries and equipping customs posts. And this is all because some people, Volodymyr Oleksandrovych, are very greedy and not very smart.

This customs "reform" began in 2021, when Volodymyr Zelenskyy, in the persona of a fighter against smuggling, staged a multi-part performance of sanctioning smugglers. The "get out of here, you robber" show successfully toured and concluded with the imposition of sanctions on both specific characters and the legal entities associated with them. These were set for three years, after which the sanctions could be extended if necessary.

For the most part, there was no need; for instance, this year, under Decree No. 169, sanctions were extended for only two individuals, while the remaining eleven were automatically lifted from sanctions.

Journalists sent official inquiries to the Office of the President, the National Security and Defense Council, and the Security Service of Ukraine, requesting an explanation as to what changes had occurred in the lives and activities of these eleven gentlemen that there was no longer a need to sanction them.

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The National Security and Defense Council pretended to be a records management department and replied that their role is minor — that they simply accept what is submitted to them by respected agencies. The Office of the President cleverly redirected the request to the clerks at the National Security and Defense Council, and they politely sent a second copy of the same formal refusal.

The SSU, however, did not miss a beat (or perhaps they did, depending on how you look at it) and officially replied that during the three years since the imposition of sanctions, "authorized state bodies, in accordance with their competencies, monitored the effectiveness of the sanctions. In April 2024, the effect of sanctions was prolonged regarding certain individuals who continue to create real and/or potential threats to national interests..." Read this as: those who did not make it onto the 2024 lists no longer pose such threats. To lock in either the failure or the victory, the SSU clarified: "The Security Service of Ukraine continues to carry out the necessary counterintelligence measures and, in the event of new threats to state security, will initiate the introduction of restrictive measures." Read this as: the "eleven friends of the smugglers" are on our radar, we are watching...

Something tells me that Mr. Malyuk has not seen this response, so we are publishing it (see document) — just in case this knife in the back starts making it difficult for Vasyl Vasylovych to sleep.

Photo: ZN.UA

After all, among those who were automatically removed from the sanctions list with the SBU’s decision are quite a few interesting characters who continue their usual activities at the border, which is certainly not in the national interest. The editorial team’s sources were very surprised to learn that the so-called Galician smuggling "aksakal" Volodymyr Polusytok no longer poses a threat to national interests.

Of course, the head of the Lviv Customs, A. Kuznik, assured the public that he had dismissed all of Polusytok’s people. But, first of all, to do this at the Rava-Ruska customs post, one would have had to dismiss absolutely everyone, without exaggeration. And secondly, are the testimonies of Kuznik himself reliable, considering his 17 years of experience in the SBU? No offense, but the connection between smugglers and SBU officers is long-standing and extends far beyond the scope of "necessary counterintelligence measures."

In reality, at the beginning of the story regarding the non-extension of sanctions, there was a suspicion that it was a case of banal extortion (a side income for many law enforcement officers). However, the scale suggested otherwise.

In addition to Polusytok, the following former members of the sanctions list are feeling confident and at ease: Odesa footwear and textile expert Denys Aminiev, Mukachevo cigarette expert Eduard Kukoba (known as "Koba" to his inner circle—and yes, they really do call him that), electronics connoisseur from the Odesa region Mykhailo Hribanov, and the former head of the capital’s customs, now a modest lover of fertilizers and flowers, Yuriy Dvorak.

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Denys Aminiev Photo: (facebook of Nataliia Nepriakina)

Yes, none of them are in Ukraine, and they do not personally drag bags of iPhones and herbicides across the border, but they didn’t do that before, either. Yet, for some reason, in 2021, counterintelligence measures were enough to warrant sanctions, while in 2024, there was no time to get around to it.

But besides the list of individuals, the sanctions decree also included a list of legal entities linked to smuggling schemes. About seven dozen of these companies fell out from under the sanctions. The vast majority of them, despite three years of restrictions, have not gone bankrupt; they are operating, have interesting directors and counterparties, and conduct business, let’s say, quite tellingly. For some, an attempt to avoid a post-audit by tax authorities is visible to the naked eye; others have obviously made it impossible to serve a protocol on customs violation, and consequently, to collect a fine; and others do business with no one but shell companies. And for such findings, you don’t need any counterintelligence tricks—everything is in the public domain, if only there were the will.

However, it somehow happened that in 2021, sanctions were imposed pompously but without disclosing any evidence, and in 2024, they were removed quietly and stealthily, despite obvious evidence of dubious activity.

This is the right time to recall that, since recently, the SBU has become a real forge of personnel for the customs service. In addition to the aforementioned Kuznik, S. Siliuk (at the Kyiv Customs), D. Raikov (in the central department for combating smuggling), and A. Kolobrodov (at the Coordination and Monitoring Customs) entered the field. There were others, too. As soon as the odious SBU officer Mykola Bezzubenko became an advisor to Andriy Yermak, the influx of "kontorski" (SBU personnel) into customs doubled.

Inconvenient questions began to arise; memories of an investigation into alleged extortion involving Bezzubenko resurfaced; his dissertation, supervised by Oleh Tatarov, was found. In short, it began to stink. They weeded out their own among strangers, but left the key players. Take, for example, Kolobrodov, the head of customs monitoring—a man who can stop any cargo with one phone call is worth any reputational risk, even if he flees from a NABU search across the roof of a restaurant (there is no proof, but ill-wishers are still laughing).

So, no matter which way you approach the smugglers, they are surrounded by a dense circle of SBU officers who, depending on their positions, are either "in the loop," "taking a cut," or "providing control."

All of this could be taken as ordinary banditry, albeit on a large scale, if not for one "but"—Seyar Kurshutov, who was the number one on the aforementioned list from Decree No. 169.

Seyar Kurshutov lives in Vienna, vacations in Monaco, hangs out with "bad boys" on Mount Athos, and occasionally spouts absolute nonsense—for example, that Ukraine will be saved by law enforcement officials. Where his Ukrainian passport is, no one knows, but it seems there is no shortage of passports from other countries. According to the legend, Kurshutov is an influential businessman, a truth-seeker, and a restaurateur. According to documents, he is a defunct sole proprietorship with a 2005 Lanos. In fact, he is someone who would be called a "friend to all friends" in certain circles—a person who knows with whom and how to negotiate to establish and maintain processes.

It seems that these very skills and abilities, which go somewhat beyond the usual hassle of crossing the border, are what interested Bankova [the Presidential Office]. His services are not needed at the level of "Vasya from the second shift will let a car full of cigarettes through"; they are for cases where the "Vasyas" are in the hundreds and the cars are in the thousands. Rumor has it that he honed his craft nowhere else but in the shadow customs system of Granovsky, under the sensitive mentorship of Oleksandr Cherepinsky—a Kharkiv expert in customs affairs and the number two on the list from Decree No. 169.

The fact that sanctions against Kurshutov and Cherepinsky were not extended this year is hardly an unfortunate oversight; it is more of an offer from Bankova, which has long been looking for sources of stable funding for the various needs that accompany state governance.

As a gesture of friendship and to strengthen Kurshutov’s primary functions, it seems he was given a stake in the anonymous Telegram channel "Dark Knight" (Daria Zarivna, an advisor to Yermak, likely knows the details). If you don’t have the stomach to descend into this Telegram sewer, believe me, everything you previously considered media-killing is just child’s play by comparison. And yet, an anonymous Telegram channel is only a bonus to the main customs offer.

Evil tongues say his terms are allegedly as follows: Kurshutov works for the state for 25 days, and for himself for five. Even more spiteful tongues disagree, saying the volumes of smuggling are now such that even five hours would be enough "for himself," even assuming the monthly maintenance of the "Dark Knight" is around $50,000. But what is truly interesting is the aforementioned "work for the state." This is the key to understanding the swamp into which Bankova seeks to submerge us up to our very ears.

Do you know what would happen if you suddenly stopped all smuggling flows in the country? Customs duties and so-called import VAT would plummet simultaneously. After all, the vast majority of smuggling consists not of "black" but of "gray" shipments, which are brought in at undervalued prices or with declared nomenclature substitution to "save" on customs duties, and are sold with a corresponding "discount," but not at "zero."

Simplified—"gray" is integrated into the white economy and affects everything—from trade turnover and demand to tax revenues. To understand the scale of the figures: customs duties, import excise, and VAT account for about 18% of all tax revenues, or 480 billion UAH for the last year. Of course, not all of these revenues come from gray schemes, but you would be surprised what a significant portion they represent.

On any marketplace, compare the prices of smartphones and try to explain the discrepancy between different sellers, which often exceeds 10,000 UAH. And then take a look at how truly broad the offer of those "cheapest" options actually is.

The shameful truth is that halting smuggling for a few months guarantees a drop in customs revenues by at least 60%; that is, instead of a hypothetical 100 UAH, only 40 UAH begins to flow into the budget. This is the top method smugglers use to pressure the state, one they employ regularly. They literally stop all flows and wait until the Ministry of Finance starts to burn. And once they reach an agreement, they start "working for the state" again. Yes, unfortunately, it turns out that the state budget is a hostage to smuggling.

Without breaking it, this customs service cannot be reformed, regardless of salary levels, integrity principles, polygraphs, or competitive selections (all of which make sense, but do not have a decisive impact).

No matter how clumsy a performance the 2021 sanctions were, even they significantly reduced smuggling flows at first and caused trouble for the smugglers themselves. Imagine what the effect would have been if, instead of sanctions lists, they and their accomplices from the authorities ended up in the dock. That was, and still is, our only chance for fundamental changes at customs.

But no, they decided at Bankova to roll back even the accidental progress that had been achieved. Because how else can one perceive a situation where SBU officers are brought into key customs positions, key smugglers are released, legal entities connected to them are operating at full tilt, and the "friend of all friends," who is supposed to support their joint coordinated work by channeling profits into the right pockets, is living his best life, boasting on every corner about how close he is with Bankova.

The situation in which the budget of a warring country is a hostage to a bunch of criminals is being cemented before our eyes for the personal gain of Yermak and Zelenskyy. They need it—they have a fiction instead of a faction, the power vertical does not hold together for free, and elections are still in the plans. After all, Kurshutov’s "work for the state" is not just about the budget. As one famous Louis once said to his parliament: the state is me.

Author: Yuliya Samaieva

Source: ZN.UA